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UJ/i Ui; UJ iJ.UJ I'AA UiZ Uid aaJi ~^r!rr^-(^ULL.UL.ii ur lamuimi^i UULLUbt, Ut-fHAKlUAl^l Tgl^nra health care expenditures. The rapid expansion of the biophannaceutical market has led to scientific, regulatory and economic debate on how to maintain an environment that provides access to affordable biopharmaceuticals and creates incentives for continued innovation and competition in the biotechnology market.
Recently, patent expiration and loss of market exclusivity on several of the earUest biopharmaceuticals stimulated a discussion on the role of generic or "follow-on" biologies in the biotechnology market. At present, the U.S. pharmaceutical regulatory process does not have a well-defined pathway for the approval of follow-on biologies. Due to the growing amount of resources devoted to biopharmaceuticals, decisions surrounding the fixture of generic competition in the biotechnology market will require consensus on the best technique to maximize the wellbeing and safety of society while maintaining a vital biotech industry.
In this paper, we first review the history of generic medication poUcy in the U.S. with emphasis on the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (HatchWaxman Act). Next, we examine the regulatory oversight of biotechnology products and review the legislative actions responsible for the current differences between drugs and biologies. We also discuss the existing approval process for follow-on biologies in the U.S. Finally, we consider the imphcations of follow-on biologies in the health care delivery system with focus on the current stakeholders, implications of the stams quo and some recommendations to guide fiiture pharmaceutical policy for biologies.
The scientific literature and independent media have relied on an assortment of terms for describmg medications, both biologies and non-biologies. For the remainder of this paper, we will use the term biologic or biophannaceutical to indicate a branded, imiovative, or smglesource biologic product. We will use the term follow-on biologic to specify a generic version of Follow-On Biologies 4
TmTTTTTD-lb:UB FAX bi2 b2b yyji tULLhUi^yh i-HAKiiiALi [grtn^ abmded biologic medication. The term generic biologic is generally considered inappropriate because it implies an exact copy of the originator's pn>dnct, which currently is impossible due to limitations in technology' Finally, when the term drug or genenc is used, it refers to a "smallmolecule" medication or a product that is chemically derived.
History of Generic Medication Policy
Researchers estimated the total cost of bringing a new molecular entity (NME) to market in the U.S. averaged $802 million dollars in 2000 when the cost of capital and company drug failures are capitalized.^ The accuracy of this estimate has become controversial but general consensus regards the pharmaceutical discovery and development process as a perilous undertaking fraught with uncertainty.' Due to the expense of creating and developing novel pharmaceutical products, the U.S. govermnent relies on intellectual property rights through provision of patents to protect imiovative products from competition for a period of time. This safeguard provides the patent holder a temporary monopoly to recoup the costs of research and development and earn sufficient profits to encourage continued imiovation in the marketplace.
Afterpatentexpiration,genericproducersmaycopytheim.ovatorproduct, enter the market, and generate price competition among several competing firms. Generic entry has played an important role within the U.S. pharmaceutical market, with generic medications costing consumers significantly less than single source brand products.^ Understanding the significance of competition between brand and generics begms with an examination of the historic regulatory amendments and market influences that brought us to the present day.
In 1962, the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) was modified by passage of the Keafauver-Harris Amendment.' Among other thmgs, this amendment required pharmaceutical companies to provide evidence of both safety and efficacy for new medications before gaming Follow-On Biologies 5
OayOiyOb T^TWrXTTTT-TTTT^n UUrnEUE-UF-TWKRHTKUl iSTTTXTmarket approval. In addition, this legislation mandated generic pharmaceutical producers to conform to the same requirements as the innovator before market entry. This regulatory change prohibited generic producers from relying on previous data generated by the innovator due to its designation as a trade-secret. As a result, this legislation created a significant barrier-to-entry for producers of generic medications. the ANDA has been submitted is not patented; 2) the product patent already has expired; 3) the date the patent will expire with projected generic entry after that date; and 4) the current product patent is not infringed or is invahd.'' The Hatch-Waxman Act also provides a period of "180-day market exclusivity" for the first generic producer to gain market approval through a paragraph IV filing.'^ This process created a strong fmancial incentive for generic producers to challenge patents it believed were invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed." As a result, generic companies could then pursue market entry earlier in the drug product life cycle.
hi addition to the ANDA outlined in section 505(j), an alternative mechanism was created to allow the sponsor of a New Drug Application (NDA) to gain market approval. This pathway is outlined in section 505(b)(2) of the FDCA and allows a company to rely on previously published data or prior FDA rulings on the safety and efficacy of a product to gam market approval. Typically, this route is utilized when a product is not identical to the mnovator and cannot be considered a generic or when additional clinical testing is requhed to gain market approval.
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As a compromise, Title II of the Hatch-Waxman Act offered imiovator pharmaceutical firms the ability to recoup patent life lost during cHnical development and regulatory oversight.
The formula used to calculate the amount of patent life regained is equal to the sum of all of the time spent during FDA review (i.e., approval time for a NDA) plus one-half of the time spent in clinical testing.*'' This determination is subject to a variety of restrictions and limits including a maximum extension of 5 years and a limit of 14 years on total effective patent life. Also, the legislation provided an initial period of market exclusivity equal to 5 years during which time no AND As could be filed.
Despite some criticisms of this legislation, it was largely successful at achieving its initial aims. Empirical evidence of pharmaceutical market adjustments after enactment of HatchWaxman was published in 1996.*^ Includmg data collected during an eariier analysis^^ the authors assembled information on 22 medications experiencing generic competition for the first time between 1989 and 1993. Using information on average sales price for the brand and generic products, the authors compared trends m generic competition and utilization to similar measures in the pre Hatch-Waxman era (described above). On average, generic products entered the market at substantially reduced prices and experienced increasing market share during this period. Thus, these findings implied that the legislation had been effective at fostering generic entry and price competition.
Evaluation of the Hatch-Waxman act on pharmaceutical innovation has proved more difficult to assess. However, the legislation was successfiil at increasing tiie average effective patent Ufe for new molecular entities by more than 2 years, thereby increasing an innovator firm's total return on investment.^^ In addition, R&D spendmg levels as a percentage of brandname manufacturers' sales revenue grew 5 percentage points between 1983 and 1995. Durmg
Follow-On Biologies 8 this same period, brand-name manufacturers' sales revenues more than tripled. At a mmimum, it would appear the incentive to invest in the development of new pharmaceutical products remained intact after the enactment of Hatch-Waxman Act.
Regulatory Oversight of Biopharmaceutical Products
The most important distinctions between biologies and drugs can be classified as either regulatory or scientific. and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) can be defined as "articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of disease" or "articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure of any fiinction of the body".'^ Based on these broad definitions, many biologies could potentially be categorized as drugs. However, biologies and drugs undergo different sets of regulatory oversight, due to both historical differences in product handling and unique physical characteristics that arise when describing biologies (discussed below in greater detail).
The scientific and technical dissimilarities between biologies and drugs are considered the primary reason for relying on different legislation to manage the U.S. regulatory environment. In an article by David Kom^°, the differences were described as follows: (1) biologies (as the name suggests) have a biologic origin or are remarkably similar to actual biologic compounds (e.g. proteins or enzymes); (2) biologies are almost exclusively given via injection compared to drugs which are most commonly taken orally; (3) biologies often are much Follow-On Biologies 9
"Tronrrv UJ u.uu i nji UIL ui.j JJJ± I^ULI^UUI^ TTI-i luiinu/n^i larger molecules than drugs; (4) biologies tend to be more heterogeneous than drugs and as such, more difficult to model or characterize; (5) biologies tend to be more dependent on the manufacturing process than drugs; and (6) biologies have a higher risk of immune related adverse reactions than synthetic drugs.
In contrast to other medications that obtain market approval through filing of an NDA, biologies are approved through a Biologic License Application (BLA) demonstrating that the product is safe, pure, and potent. In actual practice, the requirements for gaining market 
U.S. Approval Process for Follow-On Biologies
Due to the aforementioned regulatory and scientific differences, the U.S. does not currently have an abbreviated application process in place for the approval of follow-on biologies. In 1984, few biotechnology products were commercially available and biologies did not consume the level of resources observed currently. As a result, the legislation was limited to amending the FDCA and did not alter the PHSA. This left the market for biologies untouched.
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Under current law potential generic competitors are forced to conduct and finance complete clinical testing (analogous to the innovator) in order to gain market approval. As existing patents for biologies reach expiration, this requirement will substantially raise follow-on entry costs and result in higher product prices.
An interesting caveat exists due to the historic handling of some biologies. Several of the earhest biologies were approved and regulated under the FDCA instead of the PHSA (e.g., 
Implications of Follow-On Biologies in the Health Care Delivery System
Evolving follow-on biologic regulations will impact numerous segments of the pharmaceutical marketplace. At a minimum, stakeholders include consumers, the U.S. TTTJnTJZ-ib:ii 1<AA biZ bzu aaji -CrmTTTTTTrs-c»-r mission of safety.^' Due to the current environment at FDA, it seems unlikely they will make a decision on how to handle follow-on biologies in the short-term. Even if the agency does come to a conclusion, it will be hotly contested by various stakeholders. Thus, it seems more likely that a final resolution will come from congress. Congress has been active on the issue, recently holding public hearings, but has not yet reached consensus on the best course of action.
In light of current technological capabilities, a multi-tiered approach to approval of follow-on biologies could be successful.'' We would argue that decision authority should be retamed by the FDA and the review process should be given the flexibility to handle the uniqueness of each follow-on product. For example, the first tier in the review process could include comparative characterization through analytical testing of the follow-on biologic and a reference product using available technologies. The study results could then be evaluated by FDA to determine whether additional preclinical (tier two) or clinical (tier three) testing is required. We suggest that a precedent does exist with FDA to allow innovative firms to request product approval after changes in the manufacturing process. Finally, companies could be given the authority to begin testing and evaluatmg potential follow-on biologies before patent expiration of the sole-source product. Early development would permit competitors time to collect information and collaborate with FDA to ensure availability of safe and effective follow-on biologies. As the process develops, regular analysis of the consequences due to regulatory reform could be conducted to allow for poHcy refinement as needed. EstabUshment of an effective system for abbreviated approval of follow-on biologies will require substantial cooperation among all stakeholders. As such, we believe that political action will be a necessary and important step in the direction towards regulatory reform of biologies.
Conclusions
The subject of follow-on biologies has experienced considerable debate and will continue to do so as additional biologies approach patent expiration without a well defined regulatory policy. The potential for creation of a system allowing abbreviated approval for follow-on biologies exists and the need for action is becoming more urgent as multiple single-source biologies approach patent expiration. Other countries already are moving forward with biogeneric regulatory policy and are actively approving follow-on biologies."*^' ^ We propose that creation of an abbreviated system in the U.S. should emphasize safety, while creating price competition and providing stimulus for continued innovation in the biologic market.
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